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Highlights 
 
 an evaluation of the design of a new psychiatric hospital revealed varied views on 
risk management; 
 
 staff, patients and their family carers took part in a qualitative study; 
‘technical safety’ of built design and use of space governed behaviour of staff as well 
as patients; 
 
 participants emphasized that technical safety had limitations and can be 
therapeutically undesirable; 
 
 the research contributes to literature linking theories of therapeutic landscapes, social 
control and risk governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to the international literature examining design of inpatient 
settings for mental health care. Theoretically, it elaborates the connections between 
conceptual frameworks from different strands of literature relating to therapeutic landscapes, 
social control and the social construction of risk. It does so through a discussion of the 
substantive example of research to evaluate the design of a purpose-built inpatient 
psychiatric health care facility, opened in 2010 as part of the National Health Service (NHS) 
in England. Findings are reported from interviews or discussion groups with staff, patients, 
and their family and friends. This paper demonstrates a strong, and often critical awareness 
among members of staff and other participants about how responsibilities for risk 
governance of ‘persons’ are exercised through ‘technical safety’ measures and the 
implications for therapeutic settings. Our participants often emphasised how responsibility for 
technical safety was being invested in the physical infrastructure of certain ‘places’ within the 
hospital where risks are seen to be ‘located’. This illuminates how the spatial dimensions of 
social constructions of risk are incorporated into understandings about therapeutic 
landscapes. There were also more subtle implications, partly relating to ‘Panopticist’ theories 
about how the institution uses technical safety to supervise its own mechanisms, through the 
observation of staff behaviour as well as patients and visitors. Furthermore, staff seemed to 
feel that in relying on technical safety measures they were, to a degree, divesting 
themselves of human responsibility for risks they are required to manage. However, their 
critical assessment showed their concerns about how this might conflict with a more 
therapeutic approach and they contemplated ways that they might be able to engage more 
effectively with patients without the imposition of technical safety measures. These findings 
advance our thinking about the construction of therapeutic landscapes in theory and in 
practice. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper presents findings from an evaluation of a newly constructed psychiatric 
hospital building, part of the National Health Service (NHS) in England. We show how the 
geography of risk management was perceived by participants in our study, many of whom 
problematised the socio-spatial relationships between the material environment in hospital 
buildings, the social practices of risk governance and the wellbeing of patients, staff and 
informal carers. The findings reported here contribute to the international literature by 
demonstrating the connections between theories regarding: the nature of therapeutic 
landscapes; the exercise of social discipline through surveillance; and the social construction 
of technical safety. This paper makes  an original contribution by using a research design 
based in therapeutic landscape theory to demonstrate empirically how institutional risk 
governance seeks to impose ‘technical safety’ through security of the physical environment, 
but how in practice risk governance operates through the exercise of critical judgment by its 
staff and by patients.  
 
A conceptual framework for examining the ‘placement’ of responsibility for risk 
governance through ‘compassionate containment’ 
 
This paper highlights the connections between socio-geographical theories of 
therapeutic landscapes and other social theories concerned with the social interactions and 
power relationships involved in surveillance and risk governance.  
 
We explain below how the issue of risk governance emerged in the discourses of 
participants in research that was initially grounded in the concept of therapeutic landscapes 
(Gesler, 2003; Gesler, Bell, Curtis, Hubbard, & Francis, 2004). This concept of therapeutic 
landscapes has informed significant developments in the geographies of mental as well as 
physical health (Curtis, 2010). Theories included in the therapeutic landscape framework 
show how health, wellbeing and healing are associated with the complex interactions 
between people and their material, social and symbolic environments. This geographical 
perspective is not limited to assessment of regional or community level factors; it also 
applies to more specific spaces such as individual care facilities.  
 
Our findings elucidate how theories of safety and security are relevant for therapeutic 
landscapes research in health geography. We make links to the work of authors such as 
Foucault (1995/1977) and Beck (1992) who construe risk governance as a socially and 
culturally constructed process, through which society seeks to ‘govern’ risks to create what is 
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seen as a ‘safer’ environment, and to maintain social order through hegemonic power 
structures. Foucault’s ‘Panopticon’ model describes how risk governance is often pursued 
through disciplining members of society by means of surveillance and regulation. Most 
applications of this theory emphasise the ways that subordinated groups (including 
psychiatric patients) are controlled by dominant groups (such as hospital staff). However, 
particularly pertinent to our research was Foucault’s (1995, p. 204) suggestion that ‘The 
Panopticon may even provide an apparatus for supervising its own mechanisms’, reflecting 
on how institutions also exert surveillance and regulation over their own agents. Stevenson 
& Cutcliffe (2006, p. 718) also allude to this point when they comment that ‘… power is 
practiced as a set of actions upon actions’, exemplified by the risk governance protocols, 
which management requires nursing professionals to follow in psychiatric settings. Our 
analysis below contributes to this debate through a discussion of the potential for a critical, 
potentially transformative response to institutional discipline on the part of its own agents.   
 
Beck emphasises even more strongly the limitations of institutional risk governance 
strategies, arising not only from resistance, but also from the inadequacy of ‘linear’, expert 
knowledge about the nature of risks and how to control them. ‘Non-linear’ notions of risk 
reviewed by Beck (1999), imply that different social and professional groups vary in their 
perception of what constitutes risk. Also, lack of awareness and unpredictability are key 
features of risks that are difficult to address through the institutions of modern society, 
especially since, as Towl (2010) emphasizes, hazards and risk are not stable, but dynamic 
and emergent through time. Beck describes a state of collective anxiety in modern society 
about risks that we are ill-equipped to control. He argues (Beck,1999, p. 56) that ‘security 
degenerates into mere technical safety’ as risk governance operates through manipulation of 
inanimate, material features of the environment and technologies, with comparatively little 
attempt to modify the fundamental, but more intractable, human and social components of 
risk. ‘Technical safety’ may also be reflected in the emphasis on legal liability, rather than 
social or moral responsibility (Douglas, 1990).   
 
Contextualising our research in the interdisciplinary literature concerning 
security of psychiatric hospital design 
 
We explain below how our work relates to an interdisciplinary literature on security in 
psychiatric care and here we briefly summarise this literature.  
 
Public discourses often conflate ‘madness’ with high risk, feeding public perceptions of 
a growing problem of violence and assault and the need to maintain safety and security 
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(critiqued by: Moon, 2000; Jeffers, 1991; Morrison, Morman, Bonner, Taylor, Abraham, & 
Lathan, 2002; Trenoweth, 2003; Cowman & Bowers, 2008; Deacon, 2004). Aggressive 
behaviour can also lead to costs from workers’ compensation, insurance, and repairing 
damaged property (Meehan et al., 2006) which further motivates health care institutions to 
show that they are exercising risk governance. Research in Europe, North America and 
Australia has addressed the practical problems of managing perceived risks in this sector 
(e.g. Halleck & Petrilla, 1988; Nijman, Merckelbach, Allertz, & a Campo, 1997; Bowles et al., 
2002; Quirk, Lelliott, & Seale, 2004; Meehan et al., 2006; Stubner et al., 2006; Cardell, 2009; 
Fluttert, van Meijel, van Leeuwen, Bjørkly, Nijman, & Grypdonck 2011; Manna, 2010). Such 
concerns have led to ‘the re-articulation of mental health work in the language of risk’ (Quirk 
et al., 2004, p. 2574) and the emergence of a new emphasis on confinement within secure 
buildings, which is of special interest in this paper. 
 
‘Expert’ definitions of risk in psychiatric hospitals draw on ‘linear’ knowledge of the ‘risk 
factors’ that might be involved (Daffern, Mayer, & Martin, 2004; Hage, van Meijel, Flutterts, & 
Berden, 2009; Secker, Benson, Balfe, Lipsedge, Robinson, & Walker, 2004).  These risk 
factors include the personal characteristics of users (e.g., age, gender, personality traits, 
diagnosis, attitudes and behaviours) and environmental factors (e.g., family background, 
social disadvantage, physical characteristics of wards, and staff attitudes and behaviours). 
Risk management in psychiatric hospitals involves decision-making, risk reduction, 
monitoring, and evaluating the effectiveness of a hospital’s management plan.  Technical 
safety features strongly in measures to reduce risks of absconding or self-harm.   It includes 
attention to the physical layout of the hospital wards and identification of high-risk areas 
(Jeffers, 1991). Commentators also note an increasing trend towards locked wards to reduce 
the risks that patients who are legally detained in hospital will abscond, presenting a risk 
while unsupervised (Cleary, Hunt, Walter, & Robertson, 2009, p. 644). Potentially suicidal 
users should be protected by architectural barriers (Cardell, Bratcher, & Quinnett, 2009), 
including secure, non-breakable windows and breakaway shower rods; and by routine 
searches to eliminate potentially harmful objects such as cords, razors, and other items 
brought in by visitors. We present evidence below on the awareness and interpretation of 
these issues by the English NHS as an institution, and by its agents and clients at the ‘front 
line’ of service delivery.  
 
In addition, there is an extensive literature examining the importance of surveillance for 
risk governance in psychiatric hospital settings. Much of this cites Foucault’s interpretation of 
the Panopticon and its relevance for psychiatric buildings and practices. Philo (e.g. 2004) 
has extensively researched historical geographies of psychiatric institutions and post-asylum 
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geographies from these perspectives. In this paper we extend this discussion to 
contemporary hospital design, using an example of the new generation of purpose-built 
psychiatric inpatient facilities in England. 
 
This influential rhetoric emphasizing risk governance and increasingly technical 
methods of observation and control is also contested in the literature, partly due to tensions 
between this model of risk management and other aims of mental health care (Bowles, 
Dodds, Hackney, Sunderland, & Thomas, 2002; Morrison et al., 2002; Deacon, 2004; 
Cowman & Bowers, 2008; Cleary et al., 2009). An emphasis on technical procedures and 
rules to enhance security and safety for staff and service users and the general public, may 
make it difficult to provide recreational, psychotherapeutic, educational, spiritual, and 
occupational therapies (Leader, 2011, p. 296). For example, the use of CCTV cameras may 
create problems for patients with paranoia (Leader, 2011). Coercion, control measures, and 
issues of legal liability collide with patients’ rights to privacy and to make their own treatment 
choices. Locking wards may be seen as paternalistic, stigmatizing, and coercive; and, for 
‘voluntary’ service users, contradicts their status (Cleary et al., 2009). A custodial, physically 
restrictive approach conflicts with relational containment strategies and may lead to user 
aggression (Daffern et al., 2004), since users who perceive themselves as powerless may 
use aggression as a form of self-empowerment. Secker et al. (2004, p. 172) argue that 
patients’ violent behaviour may be partly due to social tensions arising from a ‘lack of staff 
engagement with clients’. Bowles et al. (2002) and Manna (2010) question the benefits of 
close observation strategies, arguing that that observation may be detrimental to psychiatric 
treatment, and advocating instead engagement as ‘a process of emotional and psychological 
containment of distress’ (Bowles et al., 2002, p. 255). In this paper we use a therapeutic 
landscape research approach to explore the awareness of these arguments among 
participants and their sense of the implications for practice as well as design of hospital 
buildings. We show below that their sense of individual agency and knowledge, and their 
critical appraisal of the ‘actions upon actions’ imposed by the institution, had potential to re-
orientate the institutional focus on technical safety and revitalize the debate about what 
comprises a therapeutic landscape. 
 
Case study and method 
 
The findings below come from a qualitative evaluation of the design of a new, purpose-
built inpatient mental health care facility (referred to as the ‘New Hospital’), opened in 2010 
as part of the NHS in England. The study was an independent, academic research project 
funded by the UK National Institute of Health Research and although the hospital 
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management collaborated very constructively with the research it did not commission this 
study. The New Hospital had 318 inpatient beds to care for patients with acute psychiatric 
illnesses, geriatric conditions, learning difficulties, and a significant number of forensic cases. 
Patients were transferred to the New Hospital from an adjacent hospital building (the ‘Old 
Hospital’), originally established as a psychiatric asylum in the 19th Century, and also from 
psychiatric wards in a hospital nearby (the ‘General Hospital’).  
 
These hospitals are located in a mid-sized town in an area of Northern England, which 
is relatively disadvantaged in terms of socio-economic conditions and population health, with 
high levels of demand for mental health care. Many service users are from disadvantaged 
families for whom it may be especially difficult to deploy social and economic resources to 
influence health service provision. This makes it especially important for local health service 
providers to reflect carefully on research about needs and preferences of patients and 
carers, and the NHS Trust agency responsible for mental health care in this area has a 
strong track record in incorporating research into practice. 
 
The main method of data collection was through discussion groups. In some cases, to 
accommodate their schedules or preferences, participants were interviewed individually. We 
aimed to include participants from groups who were differently positioned in the hospital 
institution, and likely to have varying perceptions of the hospital environment: nursing staff, 
psychiatric consultants, matrons and ward managers and other staff such as occupational 
therapists, patients, ‘informal’ carers (most of whom were family members) and carers’ 
representatives. The study was approved by the ethics review board at the researchers’ 
institution and a NHS Research Ethics Committee. Personal details were not recorded for 
confidentiality reasons, under the terms of the ethical approval for this study. Recruitment 
was based on self-selection in response to extensive advertising of the study throughout the 
hospital, so participants cannot be assumed to be entirely representative of the group from 
which they were drawn. Material is reported here from 19 group or individual meetings where 
issues of risk management were discussed, representing a subset from a total of 40 
separate conversations in the wider study as a whole. Anonymized details of the categories 
of groups and individuals providing information considered here are given in Table 1. The 
discussions and interviews were conducted by three researchers between April 2010 and 
November 2011, in three stages: (1) just before the move to the New Hospital; (2) just after 
the move; and (3) feedback and further discussion 6-9 months after the move. Participants 
from stages 1 and 2 were encouraged to take part at stage 3, to promote continuity in group 
membership. Groups are identified by numbers shown in Table 1. The participants who 
raised issues of risk and technical security were more predominantly from groups made up 
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Table 1: Group discussions and interviews: membership, timing, no of participants 
       Timing relative to move 
to the New Hospital 
Code 
used in 
text 
Discussion 
group/ 
Type of participant Type of hospital ward Year/Month No of 
participants 
individual 
interview 
Before the move 1 discussion nursing staff  forensic  2010 April  4 
to the New Hospital 2 discussion nursing staff forensic learning difficulties 2010 April  7 
  3 discussion nursing staff acute psychiatric 2010 April  3 
  4 discussion nursing staff  acute psychiatric 2010 April  5 
  5 discussion family carers acute and forensic 2010 April  4 
Immediately after the 
move  
6 interview  patient acute psychiatric 2010 August 1 
(before initial feedback) 7 discussion consultants  acute psychiatric 2010 August 4 
  8 discussion ward managers  acute psychiatric & forensic  2010 September 3 
6-9 months after the 
move 
9 discussion nursing  staff acute psychiatric 2010 December 4 
(after initial feedback) 10 interview nursing staff  acute psychiatric 2010 December 1 
  11 interview carer support 
worker 
acute/forensic service 2010 December 1 
  12 discussion nursing staff forensic   2011 January 2 
  13 discussion nursing staff low secure forensic 2011 February 4 
  14 discussion nursing staff medium secure forensic  2011 February 3 
  15 interview discharged patient acute psychiatric ward 2011 February 1 
  16 interview matron  forensic  2011 March 1 
  17 discussion current inpatients medium/high security forensic  2011 March 3 
  18 discussion consultants  acute psychiatric 2011 March 5 
  19 interview current inpatient low security forensic  2011 March 1 
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of hospital staff, which explains the preponderance of comments from staff in the findings 
reported here. In other publications (Wood et al., 2013a, 2013b) we have highlighted further 
issues which were more particularly of concern to patients and to informal carers. 
 
In the first two stages, we used an approach described in earlier publications by these 
authors (Gesler et al., 2004; Curtis et al., 2007; 2009), based in the literature on therapeutic 
landscapes (summarised above), but also grounded in the agendas set by the research 
participants. We asked our participants an open question about ‘what aspects of the hospital 
buildings are important for general wellbeing of patients, staff and visitors’ (including family 
and friends who may be informal carers). This question may have encouraged participants to 
discuss the material environment, though they also frequently considered social and 
symbolic aspects of the hospital environment. Participants commented on the Old Hospital 
and the psychiatric wards at the General Hospital, as well as the New Hospital. Their 
comments related to conditions in forensic wards, where patients are legally detained after 
committing a criminal offence and often stayed in the hospital for considerable periods, and 
also in acute wards for treatment of severe phases of mental illness, where typically hospital 
stays are shorter. Although forensic and acute wards were separate and their regimes 
varied, the presence of a large forensic facility on the site may have enhanced concern for 
security in the institution as a whole. Certainly the issue was raised in non-forensic acute 
care settings.   
 
Discussions from the first two stages were recorded and transcribed. A thematic 
analysis was initially undertaken by three of the authors to identify aspects of the hospital 
environment that respondents considered important for wellbeing. We also examined the 
rationales offered by our participants to explain why these factors in the environment were 
important for wellbeing. Various aspects of risk management emerged strongly in several of 
the transcripts, giving rise to the present paper concerning participants’ views about the 
relationships between risk management and therapeutic environments for psychiatric 
inpatient care. Our interpretations of the key themes were summarised and fed back to all 
the participants in the form of a short report in plain language. A summary of findings was 
also reported to the Management Board of the Trust managing the hospital. In the final 
round of conversations, we explained that we were interested in aspects of the hospital 
design that were important for wellbeing, and also showed participants (some of whom had 
participated in the first rounds of discussion) the feedback summary, which included issues 
of risk management. We then invited them to talk further with us about these topics, to 
explore whether new or different views had emerged over the months that had elapsed since 
the move. A further round of transcription and analysis was conducted on this additional 
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body of material through a process of ‘constant comparison’ to assess whether or not initial 
findings were reinforced.   
 
Findings: geographies of risk 
 
In the first two rounds of discussion, issues of risk management were raised especially 
by nursing staff, ward managers or consultants. Related issues were raised in discussion 
with some patients or their family carers. 
 
The institutional imperative to govern certain aspects of risk was clearly expressed 
through the particular concern among staff about the need to avoid what was termed a 
‘never event’, defined in official guidance from the Department of Health (2011a, p. 33) as a 
‘serious, largely preventable patient safety incident that should not occur if the available 
preventive measures have been implemented’. These included: escape from the forensic 
wards of mental health patients subject to Ministry of Justice restrictions; cases of suicide 
involving shower rails or curtains failing to meet prescribed standards; or deliberate or 
accidental falls from unrestricted windows. A matron commented that: ‘we have had the 
‘Never Events’ introduced by the Ministry of Justice … anyone that comes to us from a 
prison transfer, if they ever escape, the government consider it a ‘Never Event’ and we 
would just be absolutely hammered if any convicted prisoner escaped ..., so the security has 
to reflect that. Whereas the majority of the patients might not need it … they have the same 
conditions’ (matron, 16). This illustrates how nursing practice is influenced by ‘expert’ views, 
imposed at central institutional level, on particular risks to be avoided. The security 
measures required for patients presenting the greatest risks extended to the whole of a 
ward, influencing all the patients there to some extent. 
 
There was also concern over more general risks of patients’ aggressive behaviour 
toward staff and potential for self-harm:   
Researcher – ‘… what are the biggest risks of working in this kind of environment … 
[for] you or the user?’ 
Participant – ‘for us it is violence and aggression, wards have had incidents where they 
are throwing the furniture and just being critically violent to us, spitting, scratching, verbal 
abuse, pulling hair…’  
Participant – ‘some can get quite physical but … the majority of them are not 
aggressive towards staff … it is normally towards themselves …’ 
Interviewer – ‘but what about to each other?’ 
Participant – ‘No, the length of time that I have been here I have had one incident and 
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that’s it.’    
(forensic staff, 12) 
 
Family carers also expressed concerns about risks of self-harm and seemed more 
worried than staff about violent behaviour between patients: ‘… [the New Hospital has] 
isolated areas for somebody to wander into and hurt themselves or somebody else ...’ 
(carers, 5). One patient welcomed individual bedrooms at the New Hospital as providing a 
greater sense of personal control over one’s security, and being able to lock the door 
(although staff would have access); ‘… it gives you a wee bit more confidence … more 
security in yourself and you can go to sleep’ (patient, 6).   
 
Thus governance of risks associated with patients’ behaviour was seen as an 
important aspect of the therapeutic landscape, especially by hospital staff, who would be 
most aware of institutional security requirements. However, institutional risk governance was 
also represented by our participants as open to question. Below we consider participants’ 
discussion of risk governance as an aspect of the therapeutic landscape of the hospital, in 
particular:   
- the ‘placement’ (or spatialisation) of risk and responsibility for security in a way that 
emphasized, but also, for our participants, put into question ‘technical safety’ of the building;  
- a critical assessment of Panopticism and surveillance, considering both the potential 
and limitations of CCTV technology as means to impose institutional control;  
- a critique of how ‘engineering’ the ‘safe’ activities and circulation of people in the 
hospital may conflict with therapeutic care. 
 
‘Placement’ of risk and responsibility for security: risky objects and spaces 
 
NHS regulations govern the security of hospital design as well as aspects of 
therapeutic care. The Department of Health (2011b) has issued an Environmental Design 
Guide, which emphasizes the importance of providing a safe and secure environment for 
patients. It identifies three interdependent ‘domains’ of security relating to: the physical 
environment; procedural security; and the ‘relational’ environment (understanding and use of 
knowledge about patients and the environment). Security of the physical environment was 
often reflected in the comments made by our study participants, especially the staff. Some of 
the discussion suggested that by ‘placing’ the source of risks in parts of the building, human 
responsibility for security (or failures of security) might be ‘displaced’ to the inanimate 
material landscape. 
One matron at the New Hospital suggested the new building made it more possible to 
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meet required standards than in the Old Hospital:  
‘… the facilities [in the Old Hospital] ... they weren’t really fit for purpose any more … 
medium secure standards … nationally recognised standards of security, patient 
involvement, staff performance that sort of thing … the [Old Hospital] building … was not 
really meeting them any more, so we were failing. Whereas the new building more closely 
achieves those standards. … it’s things like how high is the fence, can somebody get on top 
of a roof without getting over the fence … right up to patient involvement, patient activity; the 
hours they spend in meaningful activity on a weekly basis ...’ (matron, 16).   
 
Staff described efforts to match material security standards to provide ‘containment’ as 
well as ‘refuge’ for patients. Internal courtyards in the New Hospital were described as ‘… all 
nice and secure; 5.2m internal perimeter which is a medium secure standard … you don’t 
have passers by … able to walk in and call the patients names, that kind of thing … we’re 
very self contained, where we were very open to the public previously’ (matron, 16).   
 
‘Safe’ spaces on the wards had predominantly ‘smooth’ surfaces. Protruding features 
were considered hazardous, such as free-standing metal poles supporting the ceiling in 
some common spaces on the wards, seen as a risk for self-harm for distressed patients who 
might hit themselves against hard objects, or might attempt to climb, or swing from the pole.  
An artwork comprised of poetry written in raised metal lettering, snaking along the ground, 
was seen as creating a hazard because someone might trip over it. A staff member was 
worried that someone might swallow the sharp stones laid down in courtyards. Before 
patients moved into the new building, the entire grounds and all the wards were searched 
using metal detectors to eliminate objects like screws left over from construction. 
 
Also there was strong emphasis on removal of potential ‘ligature’ points and all 
movable objects that might present a risk for self-harm. For example, a staff member told us 
that in the Old Hospital, ‘… there were a lot of ligature points in the showers, I mean you 
know the cords you pull for assistance…’ (forensic learning difficulties staff, 2). As the new 
facility was being built, a suicide prevention assessment was carried out including an 
environmental audit, checking for anything that could potentially be used to hurt oneself or 
others: ‘… they went round looking for possible ligature points ….. So that’s why the door is 
sloping, the tops of the wardrobes slope down’ (acute psychiatry staff, 10). Once the facility 
was in operation, standard procedures were used to identify and remove material risks in 
specific places. Regular routine checks were carried out for objects that could be used to 
inflict self-harm or damage others: staff looked for things like razors and other ‘sharps’, and 
pieces of string or wire.    
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Thus comments from nursing staff in particular, frequently ‘attributed’ risk to material 
features of the building. Considerable thought, effort and cost were invested in removing or 
designing out these ‘material’ risk factors in ways anticipated by Jeffers (1991) and Cardell 
et al. (2009). Notably these ‘technical security’ solutions operate by means of manipulating 
the fabric of the building and a reliance on safer design, rather than modifying the human 
behaviours of patients which are the ultimate source of these risks.  
 
However, the respondents also underlined the limits to these technical security 
strategies. For example, built design may not evolve as rapidly as expert guidance; the New 
Hospital bedrooms faced outwards, towards the secure perimeters of the site, creating more 
internal space for common rooms arranged around enclosed courtyard gardens. Recently 
issued design standards required that individual bedroom windows should face inward to 
secure courtyards. This lack of consistency with current guidelines reflected the dynamic and 
unpredictable development of expert views on how to control risk through technical safety of 
the material environment. 
 
Even where all identified risks had been designed out, building materials were not 
always resistant to the special stresses to which they were subjected when patients vented 
their feelings on the fabric of the building. For an example, a ‘seclusion room’ for observation 
of particularly ‘high risk’ patients was described as containing ‘… just a mattress and … a 
camera for observation and … a toilet where you would press a button to [flush it]’ (forensic 
staff, 12). Here a user was able to rip up the floor: ‘… we put her in and locked the door. 
Next thing she is ripping up the floor; big long strips …’ (forensic staff, 12). Staff discussed 
how patients damaged chip board walls: ‘… “put-through competitions”; who can put their 
fists through it and who can wreck the place’ (forensic staff, 1). In another situation, ‘even a 
nine-stone girl managed to kick open a magnet lock [on a door]’ (forensic ward managers, 
8). This again illustrates the impossibility of anticipating emergent risks. 
 
Staff were therefore constantly aware that security measures would be tested by 
sudden and unpredictable incidents: ‘… there is potential all the time [on forensic wards] that 
something could blow, so we should have our staffing levels reviewed on a regular basis …’ 
(forensic staff, 14).  
 
Another aspect of the ‘placement’ of responsibility for risk management was observed 
in the way that staff respond to calls from neighbouring wards to assist in dealing with such 
incidents. Their response protocol varied according to the spatial proximity of their own ward 
to the place where the incident had occurred. During one of our discussion groups an alarm 
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call sounded, but the staff were not required to attend the incident:  
Researcher [as incident alarm sounds] – ‘Is that your incident alarm?’  
Participant – ‘That’s our alarm, yeah … [explains that the incident has happened in a 
ward located next to two other wards] … so … they get a three person response quite 
quickly. We are the furthest away from them …’ 
(low secure forensic staff, 13) 
 
These accounts all reflected a socially constructed geography of risk governance, in 
which responsibility for security is exercised through management of the technical design of 
material aspects of the hospital space. Responsibility for risk containment is attributed with 
reference to where the risk is located as much as what or who is the underlying cause of the 
risk. Participants, especially staff, expressed an uncomfortable awareness of the tension 
between the idea that responsibility for risk might equate to technical security and the 
knowledge that in reality technical security solutions were constantly proving to be 
insufficient to control emergent risks. 
 
The contemporary Panopticon: limits to technical surveillance using CCTV and 
built design 
 
As we might anticipate from social theories of surveillance and social control, staff and 
carers commented on the need to observe the patients. The New Hospital was seen as 
being more fit for this purpose than older facilities, but, in spite of the long history of 
institutional attention to surveillance, some material aspects of this new,  hospital design 
obstructed observation. Also the innovation of CCTV as an example of  ‘apparatus for 
surveillance of its own mechanisms’ seemed prominent in the discussions to an extent which 
is not widely recorded in other research.   
 
The physical layout of the whole building was considered important, reflecting ideas 
from the original theory of the Panopticon (discussed above). A manager described another 
mental health facility as being ideal because it allowed one to ‘… stand at the entrance of the 
ward … and see every bit of the ward’. For some of our participants the New Hospital 
building also provided ‘lines of sight’ to assist observation: ‘... when you come out of the 
office you can see right down the corridor and then, if you just go round the first corner, you 
can see straight down the other corridor, so you can pretty much see most places on the 
ward, you know, if you are looking for patients or whatever, I think that’s a good idea’ (acute 
psychiatry staff, 3). Another manager commented that glass partitions offered a clear view of 
the garden courtyards, and a member of staff on one of the acute wards also commented 
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that the shape of the building was ‘Good for observation; you can see across the courtyard 
into the rooms at the other side.’ (acute psychiatric staff, 10). One member of staff 
appreciated being able to see a courtyard from every corridor in a ward arranged over one 
floor; this contrasted favourably with another hospital where the acute wards were on two 
floors, ‘which is terrible for observation’ (acute psychiatric staff, 4). 
 
However, the new hospital design was also criticized for failures in technical security 
which had not been anticipated, resulting in impaired surveillance. These issues were most 
often mentioned by nursing staff and one concern was that patients might harm themselves 
while unobserved. There was frequent discussion among managers and staff about specific 
hospital spaces that presented a risk because they were not easily observable. These 
included ‘blind spots’ and ‘lines of sight’ blocked by walls or furniture (such as a partition 
separating an office from a dining room, or a television and its casing protruding into the 
room). For energy efficient heating, certain doors remained closed, blocking lines of sight.  
Staff ‘located’ particular places in the hospital that interfered with observation, such as the 
new, individual bedrooms, where it was more difficult to observe patients than in the old, 
dormitory-style wards. ‘Some patients maybe need a bit more watching than others, ‘cos 
they tend to cover themselves so you can’t really see, so it means that you have to go in, 
into the room, which can be quite noisy and wakes them up …’ (acute psychiatric staff, 4).   
 
The ‘calm rooms’ in the ward spaces were also difficult to observe:  
First Participant: ‘… if anybody is being violent or having bad thoughts we put them in 
the calm room, but the calm room has got a corner in it, so they can hide in the corner …’ 
Second Participant: ‘ … it has a bit of a recess to the right, so if you are stood at the 
door they can hide behind this little recess … so you have to go in and keep checking that 
they are not messing about with any plugs or anything like that …’ 
First Participant: ‘… so I think in future if they are going to build a room like that it 
should be like a square shape, … so that there isn’t a hidey hole …’  
(forensic staff, 12) 
 
Family carers shared this concern about: ‘… isolated areas for somebody to wander 
into and hurt themselves or somebody else …’ (carers, 5).   
 
Apart from the built form of the building, discussion often focused on a technical 
innovation in the New Hospital comprising CCTV cameras installed in the common spaces. 
Participants described how, before the move to the New Hospital, there was some 
apprehension about these, although subsequently the CCTV system was generally found to 
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be acceptable in use. It seemed that staff and patients became accustomed to CCTV, and 
staff and consultants found it reassuring and useful to monitor ‘illicit’ behaviours and 
absconding, as well as self-harm or violent behaviour. 
 
Participant: ‘Yeah, … there was a lot of rumours going around when we moved over; 
… we’ll have all these cameras, and we’re going to be watched ... actually none of that has 
happened, they’re fine, they’re good, they are a good backup.’ 
Researcher: ‘And patients are fine with the CCTV?’ 
Participant: ‘Well nobody’s ever commented actually, and you don’t find them intrusive 
if you just forget they are there. But you know that they are there for backup. So if somebody 
was in the office and they were looking at the camera, and a nurse was in difficulty down a 
corridor, or somewhere, you could see straight away, so that’s good.’ 
(acute psychiatric staff, 10)   
 
‘… some people were caught on the CCTV passing … drugs to each other, and that 
was very useful, so it is not just about violence … I had a lady absconded … with some 
visitors who helped her abscond and we saw that on the CCTV so that was very useful in 
terms of dealing with it. I think that overall the CCTV has been a very positive thing for the 
unit … I mean I was a bit sceptical about it, but it’s worked, worked out really well.’ 
(consultants, 7) 
 
A forensic patient said, ‘I am not bothered, they don’t bother me, cameras …’ (forensic 
inpatients, 17) and an acute patient told us, ‘I think it’s good safety wise, definitely … it 
protects the staff and the patients doesn’t it? So they can see if anything is going on’ (acute 
patient, 15). 
 
To a greater degree than the traditional human observation methods anticipated by the 
original concept of the Panopticon, CCTV provides and records surveillance of everyone in a 
ward. Staff talked about the fact that their behaviour towards patients could be under 
scrutiny using evidence from CCTV: ‘... when an incident happens, then they use them and 
they can go back and if someone has accused one of the members of staff has done 
something untoward they can use it … also, I suppose, they can keep an eye on the staff as 
well and make sure they are doing their job ...’ (forensic staff, 12). Thus staff were 
acknowledging the potential of CCTV to serve the institution as an ‘apparatus for supervising 
its own mechanisms’ referred to in the introduction.  
 
However, limits to CCTV surveillance were commented on. A family carer said: ‘… 
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nobody will be looking at the CCTV monitor all the time …. How quickly will they pick up 
what is going off? ... they do have CCTV cameras in the corridors but … not in the 
bedrooms, for obvious reasons; I understand that, but then how are they going to monitor 
that … you know people fight and attack each other, don’t they?’ (carers, 5). Consultants we 
talked to were clear that the bedroom spaces should not have cameras due to 
considerations of human ‘rights’ to dignity and privacy. One commented that: ‘... there 
couldn’t possibly be cameras in the bedroom “cos of human rights” and another concurred: ‘I 
think we have got enough as it is and I think it works quite well’ (consultants,18). Doubts 
were also expressed about whether CCTV observation was a good substitute for the 
watchful presence of a nurse among the patients in the ward. A member of staff from a 
forensic ward commented that: ‘… it’s not the same having the camera, you know. You are 
sat in the office [where CCTV screens are located]; you don’t get into the day area with the 
patients doing your job, … so that is a negative’ (forensic staff, 14).   
 
Some forensic patients also expressed mixed feelings about the use of CCTV.  
Different patients commented that: CCTV is ‘… an infringement of your privacy as there is 
cameras everywhere …’ ; ‘… it is supposed to be your home …’; ‘… you are on camera 
when you are waiting for your medication and you get sick of it …’ (forensic inpatients, 17).  
 
A matron argued that CCTV is more useful in dealing with the aftermath of incidents on 
the ward than in preventing them: 
Researcher: ‘… are [the CCTV cameras] useful in stopping incidents?’ 
Participant: ‘No, not necessarily, the patients are aware it’s there, so maybe … it does 
act as a sort of control on behaviour, but we haven’t really found that; if someone wants to 
behave, er, disgracefully they tend to and the cameras don’t put them off’.              
Researcher: ‘… does that give you a secure feeling?’ 
Participant: ‘No, not especially, no, they are purely for the aftermath, it’s not going to 
stop me getting punched having a camera in the day room – I am still going to get punched – 
just other people will be able to watch it afterwards’ (matron, 16). 
This exchange seems important as it again puts in question to what extent institutional 
control and discipline can be achieved through modern technical surveillance strategies. The 
surveillance function is presented here as auditing events to establish liability rather than 
avoiding untoward incidents. 
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Engineering security vs therapeutic care  
 
The discussion above illustrates how participants expressed a critical awareness of the 
limitations of technical safety measures. This critique was extended by various groups of 
participants who also commented that concentrating on ‘technical safety’ of the physical 
environment and observation of patient’s activities and movements could impede their 
capacity to attend to the social and physical needs of patients and informal carers.  
 
For example, security concerns limited use of spaces originally intended for 
therapeutic activities designed to help patients develop skills for daily living. Staff found this 
frustrating: 
First Participant:‘I’ll tell you what, it is a bit silly for me … we have a patients’ kitchen 
and we have never been able to use it since we have moved over here, … instead of them 
having the independence to be able to go and make their own cup of tea … we have to put 
[tea] trolleys out for them.’ 
Researcher: ‘So why can’t you use it [the kitchen]?’ 
Two Other Participants: ‘Ligature points!’ 
First Participant: [big sigh of frustration] ‘Ligature points!’ 
Second Participant: ‘and, er, risk assessments’. 
(acute psychiatric staff, 9) 
 
The growing emphasis on security, prompted by responses to specific incidents in 
other hospitals, was thought by a matron to reduce the scope for therapeutic activities away 
from the hospital site:‘The government’s attitude, the press’s attitude, like “serial killer on 
loose with axe on holiday”, all that kind of thing, [mean that activities such as patient holidays 
away from the hospital] has all been knocked on the head … we used to have patient 
holidays …’ (matron, 16). 
 
In secure wards, strict security controls governed visits by family members, though 
nurses seemed to apply these rules with a degree of flexibility. 
First Participant: ‘There is set times for them … but if they are coming from quite a 
distance or if they work we will be more flexible with them …’  
Second Participant: ‘... we allow two visitors on the ward at any time …’ 
First Participant: ‘… they are all supervised as per policy; all visitors have to be 
supervised by a member of staff …’ 
Researcher: ‘… so is it like a booked visit system?’ 
First Participant: ‘Yeah, well, they are supposed to give us 24 hours notice; again, if 
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someone phones in the morning we will book them in.’   
 (low secure forensic staff, 13) 
 
Such regulations may restrict the beneficial experience of carers’ visits. A carers’ 
support worker commented that for visitors to the forensic wards security measures could 
seem ‘quite daunting … it does feel almost like you are going somewhere quite dangerous 
…’ (carers’ support worker, 11). 
 
Some forensic patients were required to be escorted when going outside the ward, 
which limited the opportunities for healthy activities such as occupational therapy or visits to 
the gym, located in a different part of the building. This was becoming an issue in the New 
Hospital because more stringent requirements for supervision were making it more 
complicated to move patients between different parts of the hospital building. A nurse 
commented: ‘I am struggling with taking people to the gym now we are in this new building. It 
has to be with two staff [escorting the patient] whereas in the old building I could take them 
with one staff member and so it was very easy for me to take the lads down. Now, with 
staffing levels the way they are, they are missing out because now they are not going no 
more.’ (forensic staff, 14). Forensic patients also suggested that ‘the shortage of staff means 
… you don’t get a lot of exercise,’ and that ‘you are trapped in, everything looks the same; 
it’s a little boring’ (medium secure forensic patients, 17). 
 
Other feedback from patients showed that they acknowledged that risk management 
was important, though some were concerned it was over-emphasised: ‘Health and safety is 
all the rage these days, and it usually takes precedence over a lot of issues’ (forensic 
patient, 19). Patients cited specific problems that technical safety strategies caused for their 
wellbeing. One of the forensic patients suggested that ‘it would be nice to have a carpet,’ but 
that one of the reasons why this was not possible was because of ‘health and safety’  
(forensic patients, 17). Another complained that: ‘you are going a bit too far with the ligature 
points, I suppose people have to be protected, but there was a clock hung over there by a 
nail in front of the [staff] office, but it was taken away and the clock came down … I mean it 
is a rehabilitation ward for a start, I can’t see someone hanging themselves in front of the 
office … it’s just silly … I understand you need to be protected, that’s why pictures can’t go 
on the wall’ (forensic patient, 19). While it is possible that the clock was removed for other 
reasons, the significant point here is that the patient perceived this change as part of a 
general tendency for over-exaggerated emphasis on technical aspects of ward security. 
 
Adjustable windows for flexible ventilation were of concern to one patient and this 
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account reflects a sense of resigned acceptance of the demands of technical security that 
removed this amenity: 
‘Second best feature, in my bedroom is the sliding sort of patio style window, and it’s 
meshed, so that no contraband can be passed through, and in the summertime there’s a 
lovely breeze through, and the warmth, and at night time it is just nice to have it just ajar so I 
can keep warm …. Then about four months ago everybody’s window was either locked open 
… or locked closed, and I was very disappointed, but I didn’t take it any further because I 
knew it was an issue that’s come from security …’ (forensic patient, 19). 
 
Several participants recognized the tension between risk management and other 
aspects of care and therapy, and the need to achieve the right balance between these. One 
of the ‘modern matrons’ at the hospital reflected that ‘… we have got a dual role; a clinical 
role to provide the care and attention the patient needs because they are not well, but we 
also have to maintain the security of the place to make sure we are not letting anyone out 
and putting anyone at risk’ (matron, 16). 
 
Some staff members were consciously thinking about how to achieve a better 
therapy/security balance. For example, it was suggested that nursing staff should use good 
judgment about when to ‘trust’ patients to take some responsibility for their own behaviour, 
as part of the recovery process. This was illustrated in the following exchange: 
First Participant: ‘… we found a girl with a big long bit of wire and she hid this above 
her bathroom, so it’s like, if she wanted to kill herself, that’s what she would have used …’ 
Second Participant: ‘But she admitted to it, didn’t she? And she gave it in didn’t she?  
So it’s a way they are coping as well, to hand things over; they feel good for doing it 
sometimes.’ 
First Participant: ‘Yeah, because we praise them … when they hand the razor in, it’s a 
bit of trust as well, you have to take risks.’ 
Second Participant: ‘To be honest, if you took everything away from them all the time, 
you can’t tell if they are improving or not improving…. We know their tricks and we know the 
traits. … I could tell you when they are going to do something …’ 
(forensic staff, 12) 
 
These comments seem to suggest a perception shared by staff and patients that some 
degree of technical safety management should be sacrificed in the interests of more 
therapeutic care and trust gained from a stronger reliance on social interactions and 
understanding between staff and patients. 
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Discussion 
 
Our findings relate to the discourses of selected individuals from a single case study 
and the details are not necessarily generalisable. Furthermore, we have noted that this 
evaluation of a new hospital building may have focused attention of our participants 
especially on physical infrastructure.   
 
Our findings make an original contribution to therapeutic landscapes theory by 
elucidating how technical security dimensions of the physical environment of the hospital 
contribute to its function as a therapeutic landscape. We do this by considering some of the 
most recent contemporary developments in hospital design and technology. Also, we show 
how arguments concerning the limits to technical safety put forward by authors such as Beck 
lead us to a more nuanced understanding of some of Foucault’s arguments concerning the 
ways that institutions control not only those that they are charged to care for, but also those 
who work as ‘agents’ of the institution. Our findings draw attention to the potential of these 
‘agents’ as ‘actors’ promoting change in organizational risk governance. 
 
Much research focuses on social behaviour and practice (especially nursing practice 
intended to control risks presented by patients’ behaviours). This paper draws attention to 
the interaction between the material environment and social environment and contributes 
theoretically to the growing literature on therapeutic landscapes. Our discussions with 
participants in this study underlined the usefulness of examining risk perception and 
management from a spatial perspective. Many specific risks were represented as ‘located’ in 
parts of the built infrastructure, such as inadequate building materials or ligature points, and 
this rhetoric reflects a tendency to displace responsibility from the human actor to the 
inanimate built environment. These places became the focus of continual searches and 
attempts to eliminate risk, consistent with the idea of a ‘Panopticon’ geography of 
surveillance, illustrated by concerns for ‘blind spots’, ‘danger spots’, and unimpeded ‘lines of 
sight’, as well as increased watchfulness over patients’ movements through less controlled 
spaces.   
 
The paper also demonstrates the significance for practice of the introduction of CCTV 
surveillance of parts of the hospital space, creating a contemporary geography of perceived 
risk and risk governance, where privacy was perceived to equate with danger for some of 
our participants. Our respondents commented on how, through CCTV, the ‘Panopticon’ now 
applies to all people in a hospital; staff as well as patients. This seems consistent with 
Foucault’s (1995, p. 204) suggestion that ‘The Panopticon may even provide an apparatus 
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for supervising its own mechanisms’. However, a further nuance of this argument emerging 
in our study was that the use of CCTV may illustrate how compliance with risk governance 
mechanisms may become an end in itself, rather than the actual control and reduction of 
risk. Thus recording untoward events rather than preventing them may become the security 
objective. 
 
At the same time, we have demonstrated in this research a strong awareness among 
those working in the hospital of the theoretical critique of risk containment measures 
constructed according to a ‘linear model’ of risk, which cannot ensure complete risk 
prevention and may conflict with other principles that are important in a healing environment.  
Although technical safety measures were in place it had not been possible for building 
design to keep pace with changing risk governance guidance or with constantly proliferating 
instances of new aspects of risk being discovered. Furthermore, some aspects of technical 
safety were seen to be at odds with other objectives for therapeutic care. The move to the 
New Hospital had provided an opportunity to enhance the material environment and levels of 
technical safety, but such measures could not, in practice, keep pace with emergence of 
new aspects of risk and risk governance. 
 
The research participants (particularly members of staff) therefore expressed a critical 
perspective on technical safety measures, in a way that is not always anticipated by theories 
representing them as ‘agents of the institution’, whose individual initiative is subjugated to 
institutional policies and discipline. On one hand they acknowledged the possibility that staff 
and the institution might seek to displace some of the burden of responsibility that they carry, 
through greater reliance on technical safety measures. However, we also show that they 
resisted this tendency, and were very alert to the failures and inadequacies of technical 
safety strategies in the form of contemporary built structures and technologies. They seemed 
to be ready to assume (or perhaps more accurately re-appropriate) a greater degree of 
human responsibility for managing risk, through action focused more on the human patients 
they were caring for.   
 
Environmental Design Guidance for ‘medium secure’ hospital settings, issued in 
England by the Department of Health (2011b, p. 7), emphasizes the importance of a 
‘balance required … between maintaining the safety and security of patients and staff … 
[and providing a] … beneficial therapeutic environment’. However, the guidance is not very 
detailed in terms of how to achieve this, and several of our respondents argued this is a 
difficult balance to strike. These arguments are consistent with literature suggesting that 
‘technical safety’ is not a sufficient solution in psychiatric care settings and that risk 
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management cannot depend on planned containment strategies. Zinn (2008) and Trenoweth 
(2003) call for a ‘flexible’ compromise ‘in between’ ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational’ solutions, 
deploying trust and emotion, and this was in part what our participants also seemed to be 
advocating. Our therapeutic landscapes perspective has highlighted that the spatial and 
material context for these behaviours, as well as the social relations involved, are put in 
question by this vision of a more flexible and intuitive approach to risk governance. The 
challenge, then, for the next generation of psychiatric hospital design is likely to focus on 
how to create spaces of care which offer reasonable levels of technical safety, but also 
flexibility to accommodate changes in practice, including a possible future trend toward 
practice guidelines that allow for ‘therapeutic risk-taking’, negotiated in a way that 
empathises with patients’ experiences and feelings (UKCC, 1998; Bowles, et al. 2002 p.258; 
Lankshear, Ettorre, & Mason, 2005). Critical comments by our participants suggest they are 
potentially active forces for change in these directions. We concur with Leader’s (2011, p. 
330) comment that ‘Therapy can do no more and no less here than to help the psychotic 
subject … create a safe space in which to live.’ While a ‘safe place’ implies a reasonable 
degree of ‘technical safety’, it may, as importantly, embrace social, psychological, and 
emotional safety, corresponding to the relational, social and symbolic dimensions of 
therapeutic landscapes.  
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